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Forthcoming in: Pluralism and European Private Law 
(Leone Niglia, ed., Hart, 2013) 
 
The recent popularity of legal pluralism has now reached the area of European private 
law. In this paper I scrutinize the concepts of legal pluralism used by three of its most 
prominent proponents: Pierre Legrand, Jan Smits, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. I do not 
offer fully-fledged criticism of their theories (each of which are among the most 
fascinating and helpful in the European private law debate) but only address their use of 
ideas of legal pluralism, and the relation of these ideas with the legal pluralism debate. 
My analysis shows not only that these three use sharply different concepts of legal 
pluralism, but also, that none of these three concepts is in accordance with traditional 
definitions of pluralism. Further, it turns out that several points of criticism can be raised 
against their theories that stem from the legal pluralism debate.  I do not, here, take the 
second step of determining whether an actual concept of European private law pluralism 
can be established – and whether such a concept can withstand the criticism that has been 
voiced against the idea of legal pluralism. 
 
























between	 the	 member	 state	 level	 and	 the	 European	 level.	 The	 substance	 of	 this	
debate	has	 remained	 remarkably	 constant	 in	 since	 it	 arose	 some	 thirty	 years	ago,	
despite	the	events	that	have	taken	place	during	that	period:	the	growth	of	actual	EU	
legislation	 in	 European	 private	 law;	 the	 formulation	 of	 a	 social	 alternative	 to	 the	
perceived	market	 liberal	private	law	ideal	dominating	in	EU	law,	the	simultaneous	
broadening	 and	 deepening	 of	 European	 integration,	 etc.	 Still,	 the	 basic	 question	









own	 identity	beyond	that	of	a	purely	economic	union.	 It	 is	perhaps	 in	response	 to	
these	 changes	 that	 defenders	 of	 national	 private	 law	 are	 now,	 more	 and	 more,	
invoking	a	new	 idea	–	 that	of	 legal	pluralism.2	And	 indeed,	 some	Europeanists	are	
accepting	the	terminology	and	begin	to	argue	against	such	legal	pluralism.3	
	
But	 legal	 pluralism	 is	 no	 invention	 by	 private	 lawyers—both	 the	 concept	 and	 the	
theory	 have	 spurred	 long	 discussions	 in	 legal	 anthropology,	 legal	 sociology,	 and	
legal	theory.	Although	proponents	of	a	European	legal	pluralism	sometimes	invoke	
these	discussions,	 they	 tend	 to	gloss	over	 the	precise	way	 in	which	 the	concept	 is	
defined	and	defended	in	these	debates,	and	they	tend	to	ignore	the	backlash	that	has	
emerged	against	 the	concept	 in	 these	disciplines.	This	 is	unfortunate.	After	all,	 the	




















scrutinize	 the	 concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 used	 by	 three	 of	 its	 most	 prominent	
proponents:	 Pierre	 Legrand,	 Jan	 Smits,	 and	 Thomas	 Wilhelmsson.	 I	 do	 not	 offer	
fully‐fledged	 criticism	 of	 their	 theories	 (each	 of	 which	 are	 among	 the	 most	
fascinating	and	helpful	 in	the	European	private	 law	debate)	but	only	address	their	
use	 of	 ideas	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 and	 the	 relation	 of	 these	 ideas	 with	 the	 legal	
pluralism	debate.	My	analysis	shows	not	only	that	these	three	use	sharply	different	
concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 but	 also,	 that	 none	 of	 these	 three	 concepts	 is	 in	
accordance	 with	 traditional	 definitions	 of	 pluralism.	 Further,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	
several	 points	 of	 criticism	 can	be	 raised	 against	 their	 theories	 that	 stem	 from	 the	
legal	pluralism	debate.		I	do	not,	here,	take	the	second	step	of	determining	whether	





The	 traditional	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 developed	 in	 legal	 anthropology	 and	
sociology	to	analyze	overlapping	normative	orders	within	societies,	became	popular	























lawyers.	After	all	 ‘private’	 law	has	always	been	about	both:	 law	made	 for	 and	 law	
made	by	private	parties.7	However,	although	some	participants	in	the	debates	about	
European	private	law	do	include	the	first	aspect	and	address	the	existence	and	role	
of	 non‐state	 law	 in	 European	 private	 law,8	the	 focus	 on	 the	 debate	 on	 European	
private	 law	pluralism	is	on	the	second	aspect,	 that	of	plurality.	This	might	suggest	
that	what	authors	mean	when	they	say	pluralism	is	merely	plurality,	and	therefore,	
debates	 on	 legal	 pluralism	 would	 not	 be	 helpful.	 I	 do	 not	 think	 this	 response	 is	
successful.	 If	 indeed	 the	 European	 discourse	 addresses	merely	 the	 existence	 of	 a	




The	 first	 generation	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 at	 least	 in	 this	 trajectory,	 was	 developed,	
especially	 by	 lawyers,	 in	 the	 colonial	 and	 postcolonial	 context.9	Colonies	 in	 Africa	
and	 Asia	 lacked	 the	 order	 of	 law	 in	 European	 states;	 they	 displayed	 somewhat	
unorganized	 laws	 that	 were	 deemed	 tribal,	 or	 customary	 law.	 Colonizing	 powers	
imposed	their	own	 law,	while	carefully	 leaving	some	space	 for	 this	customary	 law	


























This	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 came	 under	 severe	 criticism.12	The	main	 criticism	
was	 that	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 state	 is	 still	 viewed	 as	 superior	 to	 other	 legal	
orders	was	no	way	to	overcome	state	centralism.13	In	some	ways,	it	creates	even	an	
enhanced	 state	 centralism,	 because	 now	 state	 law	 sets	 out	 to	 define,	 and	
subordinate,	even	non‐state	normative	orders.14	It	was,	in	other	words,	‘weak’	legal	
pluralism.	Moreover,	to	subject	non‐state	legal	orders	to	the	recognition	by	the	state	
was	 considered	 oppressive:	 recognition	 should	 be	 a	 consequence	of	 these	 orders’	





An	 alternative	 to	 this	 ‘weak’	 or	 juridical	 legal	 pluralism	was	 sought	 and	 found	 in	
what	 is	 sometimes	 called	 ‘strong’	 or	 sociological	 legal	 pluralism.	 This	 view	 takes	
legal	 pluralism	 as	 a	 fact	 of	 sociological	 observation,	 which	 demonstrates	 that	






because	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 different	 normative	 orders	 is	 under	 constant	
negotiation.	Conflict	of	laws	rules	are	also	dismissed	(in	my	view,	a	bit	too	hastily)17,	





This	 ‘new’	 legal	 pluralism	 was	 not	 necessarily	 confined	 to	 the	 colonial	 and	



















In	 recent	 years,	 the	 idea	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 whether	 weak	 or	 strong,	 juristic	 or	
sociological,	has	come	under	severe	criticism	in	legal	sociology	and	anthropology.18	
Notably	(and	importantly)	the	alternative	proposed	by	the	critics	has	not	been	legal	
monism.	 Their	 point	 was	 not	 to	 deny	 the	 plurality	 of	 law,	 but	 rather	 the	 way	 in	
which	this	plurality	is	conceptualized	by	proponents	of	legal	pluralism.	
	
Among	the	myriad	of	critical	points,	 the	 following	may	be	the	most	helpful	 for	the	
debate	on	legal	pluralism	in	Europe.	First,	ideas	of	legal	pluralism,	willingly	or	not,	
tend	 to	 prioritize,	 normatively,	 plurality	 over	 uniformity,	 without	 a	 clear	
justification.19	In	 the	 same	 realm,	 they	 prefer	 the	 local	 over	 the	 global,	 or,	 put	
differently,	they	tend	to	romanticize	customary,	non‐state	legal	orders,	while	at	the	
same	time	villifying	the	state.	Second,	studies	of	 legal	pluralism	are	often	blind	for	
power	 relations,	 both	 within	 and	 between	 legal	 orders:	20	The	 emphasis	 on	 a	
plurality	 of	 legal	 orders	 underestimates	 the	 tendency	 of	 some	 of	 those	 to	 be	 far	
more	 powerful	 than	 others;	 the	 view	 of	 customary	 legal	 orders	 as	 ‘black	 boxes’	
makes	criticism	of	 the	content	of	customary	 law	difficult	 to	sustain.	 (This	struggle	
plays	 out	 also	 in	 the	 debate	 between	 multiculturalism	 and	 basic	 rights,	 and	 the	
question	 whether	 the	 autonomy	 of	 groups	 should	 be	 recognized	 even	 if	 these	
groups	 themselves	 discriminate	 internally	 against	 their	 members.)	 Third,	 legal	
pluralism	 tends	 to	 essentialize	 legal	 orders—it	 assigns	 objective	 reality	 to	 them,	
whereas	 in	 reality	 such	 orders	 remain	 in	 constant	 flux,	 may	 change	 over	 time,	
develop	 both	 internally	 and	 in	 their	 relationship	with	 other	 orders.21	Fourth,	 and	
relatedly,	the	idea	of	legal	pluralism	requires	the	possibility	to	distinguish	between	
legal	 relations	 within	 a	 legal	 order	 and	 relations	 between	 legal	 orders;	 it	 must	
therefore	assume	relatively	strong	boundaries	between	legal	orders,	and	a	relatively	




















My	 first	 example	 comes	 from	 Pierre	 Legrand,	 who	 has	 long	 advocated	 that	 the	
plurality	of	European	legal	systems	is	both	desirable	and	insurmountable.		Legrand	
is	responsible	for	a	university	program	on	‘globalization	and	legal	pluralism’	at	the	
Sorbonne,	 and	 frequently	 invokes	 ideas	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 for	 his	 opposition	 to	
convergence	and	unification	of	European	private	law.24	Here	is	an	excerpt	from	his	
criticism	of	the	Draft	Common	Frame	of	Reference	project:25	
I need not even argue that legal pluralism is inherently good. It is enough for me to say 
that legal traditions and the diversity of forms of life-in-the-law they embody remain the 
expression of the human capacity for choice and self-creation and, as such, deserve to be 
respected as incorporating a vital aspect of social existence which helps to define 
selfhood. Legal communities and individuals within these communities deserve to be 
given their historical due. They are entitled to deep-level recognition. Indeed, they can 
demand recognition of their ontological identity but also of their positional identity; I 








First,	 Legrand	 suggests	 that	 legal	 traditions	 must	 be	 recognized	 because	 they	
express	 ‘the	human	capacity	 for	 choice	and	self‐creation;’	 they	 incorporate	 ‘a	vital	
aspect	 of	 social	 existence	which	 helps	 to	 define	 selfhood.’	 Legal	 traditions	 are,	 in	
other	 words,	 both	 the	 object	 of	 choice	 and	 its	 precondition.	 We,	 as	 individuals,	
should	be	free	to	choose	our	own	legal	tradition	–	say,	that	of	English	law—and	not	
have	 some	 foreign	 tradition	 imposed	 on	 us—say,	 that	 of	 the	 civil	 law,	 or	 of	 a	
European	civil	code.	And,	at	the	same	time,	if	we	are	denied	our	legal	tradition,	we	
are	 denied	 our	 own	 social	 existence	 and	 thereby	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	
meaningful	choice.	
Legal	traditions	are	thus	object	and	precondition	of	choice	at	the	same	time.	This	is	
not	 paradoxical,	 but	 it	makes	 the	 role	 of	 choice	 certainly	more	 complex	 than	 this	
seemingly	 simple	 quote	 suggests.	 Thus,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 Legrand	 does	 not	 here	









where	 law	 becomes	 a	mere	 product.27	He	 would	 view	 a	 law	market	 as	 an	 undue	
imposition	 of	 the	 logic	 of	 economics,	 competition,	 and	 commensuration,	 on	 legal	
traditions.28	In	 his	 proposal,	 we	 are	 in	 fact	 allowed	 only	 to	 choose	 our	 own	 legal	





On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Legrand	 is	 certainly	 correct	 that	we	make	 our	 choice	 not	 in	 a	
vacuum	 but	 within	 the	 constraints	 and	 empowerments	 from	 our	 environment,	
including	 our	 culture	 and	 our	 legal	 tradition.	 True	 choice	 and	 true	 definition	 of	
selfhood	 are	 not	 possible	 without	 recognition	 of	 that	 environment,	 and	 that	




watertight	 one.	 Amartya	 Sen,	 for	 example,	 has,	 without	 addressing	 Legrand	 or	
comparative	 law,	 suggested	 that	 our	 identities	 are	 a	 matter	 of	 our	 choice,	 not	
necessity.32	Moreover,	Sen’s	 idea	of	 ‘substantial’	 freedom	 is	almost	 the	opposite	of	





What	 seems	 odd,	 however,	 is	 his	 implicit	 assumption	 that	 that	 environment	 is	
necessarily,	and	unchangeably,	given	by	a	national	legal	tradition.	This	assumption	
is	 not	 implied	 by	 his	 communitarian	 allies—whereas	 Hegel,	 of	 course,	 indeed	
viewed	the	state	as	the	highest	order,	communitarians	in	his	succession	like	Taylor	
and	Walzer	have	emphasized	the	importance	of	non‐state	communities	and	orders,	

































This	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 permeates	discussions	 in	 legal	 pluralism,	 too:	 cultures	 and	
traditions	 are	 viewed	 as	 deserving	 protection	 merely	 because	 they	 exist.	 This	
sounds	 attractive,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 obvious.	 The	 mafia	 culture	 is	 cruel;	 is	 it	




The	biggest	problem,	however,	 lies	 elsewhere:	 It	 is	 fine	 to	 recognize	 communities	
and	individuals,	but	what	 if	 there	 is	a	conflict	between	what	 legal	communities	are	
due	and	what	individuals	within	these	communities	are	due?	This	is	the	issue	brought	
to	 the	 fore	 in	 Susan	 Moller	 Okin’s	 now	 famous	 powerful	 question	 whether	
multiculturalism	 is	bad	 for	women,	because	 the	cultural	groups	 that	we	recognize	
















which	of	 them	should	 take	priority.37	The	mere	 idea	of	 (‘deep’)	 recognition,	which	
Legrand	 borrows	 from	 Michael	 Walzer,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 help;	 it	 is	 precisely	 in	
response	 to	 the	 emphasis	 on	 recognition	 (by	 Walzer	 and	 others)	 that	 Okin’s	
challenge	and	the	ensuing	debate	arose.	
These	questions	 are,	 at	 least	 prima	 facie,	 relevant	 also	 to	private	 law.	Private	 law	
has	traditionally	been	viewed	as	freedom‐enhancing,	but	there	is	little	doubt	that	it	
can	 also	 be	 constraining.38	Same‐sex	 couples	who	 cannot	 get	married	 under	 Irish	
law	are	 an	obvious	 example.	 consumers	who	are	barred	 from	purchasing	 	 certain	
products	 are	 another,	 but	 of	 course,	 so	 are	 consumers	 who	 are	 stuck,	 under	




each	 provide	 the	 best	 opportunities	 for	 improvement	 internally.	 This	 would	 be	
plausible	 if	 indeed	 freedom	 and	 embeddedness	 within	 one’s	 legal	 tradition	 were	





her	 own	 government	 to	 justify	 its	 actions.39	Here,	 the	 alternative	 is	 not	 between	
recognizing	 the	 legal	 order	 and	 recognizing	 the	 individual.	 Rather,	 the	 idea	 is	 for	
European	 law	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 her	 society	
and	empower	her,	 to	some	extent	and	under	certain	conditions,	vis‐à‐vis	 the	 legal	
order.	 Legrand	 would	 probably	 reject	 such	 types	 of	 intervention	 because	 of	 the	
violence	 they	commit	against	a	 legal	 culture	 that	deserves	protection,	but	he	does	





civil	 law.’40	Legrand	 borrows	 the	 idea	 of	 antirrhesis	 from	 Peter	 Goodrich,	 who	 in	




















It	 seems	 questionable	 whether	 such	 antirrhesis	 really	 describes,	 in	 an	 objective	
sense,	the	view	the	common	law	takes	of	the	civil	law.	Goodrich	himself	does	argue	
this,	but	mainly	in	the	context	of	debates	in	sixteenth	century	England:	 ‘the	rule	of	




today—or	why	 this	 particular	 view	 of	 the	 rhetorical	 element	 in	 the	 common	 law,	
found	in	the	common	law,	should	be	unavoidable	for	modern	(or	postmodern)	legal	
anslysis.43	







point	 that	 the	 common	 law	 is	 incommensurable	 with	 the	 civil	 law	 is	 itself	 a	
rhetorical	move,	a	claim	not	for	empirical	truth	but	a	position.	
	
Whether,	 then,	 the	 common	 law	 is	 really	 antirrhetic	 vis‐à‐vis	 the	 civil	 law,	 is	 a	





















one	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 at	 all.	 If	 legal	 pluralism	 depicts	 ‘the	 coexistence	 of	 several	
normative	 orders	 in	 the	 same	 social	 field’	 then	 Legrand’s	 depiction	 is	 not	 legal	
pluralism,	because	he	denies,	or	at	least	downplays,	the	existence	of	the	very	social	
field	in	question:	for	him,	legal	traditions	exist	in	neatly	distinct	fields.	This	is	quite	a	
powerful	 limitation	 of	 his	 theory,	 because	 it	 is	 the	 very	 interpenetration	 of	 legal	
orders	 that	 creates	 the	 question.	Moreover,	 although	 he	 sometimes	 denies	 this,	45	







Such	 criticism	 may	 not	 be	 apt	 against	 Jan	 Smits’s	 recent	 development	 of	 legal	




sole	 source	 of	 legitimacy	 for	 private	 law	 norms.47	A	 plurality	 of	 sources	 exists—
some	national,	 some	European,	some	non‐state—and	the	multiple	sources	overlap	
(have,	as	he	puts	it,	‘an	equal	claim	to	validity’48)	and	stand	in	no	clear	hierarchical	
relation	 that	 could	establish	priorities.	As	a	 consequence,	 it	becomes	questionable	
whether	 private	 law	 is	 still	 ‘a	 system.’	 Smits	 argues	 that	 such	 pluralism	 should	
neither	be	eliminated—through	uniformisation	or	 through	 top‐down	allocation	by	
means	 of	 private‐international‐law	 rules—nor	 managed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 some	
overarching	policy,	as	in	the	Open	Method	of	Coordination.	Rather,	plurality	should	























where	 Legrand,	 like	 juridical	 pluralists,	 speaks	 of	 several	 incompatible	 but	
internally	 largely	 homogenous	 legal	 traditions	 (as	 expressed	 in	 national	 legal	
systems),	 Smits,	 seemingly	 like	 sociological	pluralists,	 emphasizes	 the	hybridity	of	
the	emerging	 law.	Where	Legrand	essentially	claims	that	 individuals	belong	 firmly	






not	 of	 choice	 but	 of	 necessity:	 a	 London‐born	 Muslim	 may	 feel	 both	 as	 an	
Englishman	and	as	a	Muslim,	but	neither	identity	is	a	matter	of	choice	for	him,	and	




opposite	 of	 the	 community‐bound	 individual	 that	 many	 legal	 pluralists	 have	 in	








of	 legal	 pluralism,	 which	 enables	 in	 particular	 members	 of	 minorities	 to	 alter,	
strategically,	between	the	invocation	of	different	rules	for	their	interest—state	rules,	

















rules.	 This	makes	 it	 necessary	 to	 distinguish	 facilitative	 from	mandatory	 rules,	 as	
Smits	points	out,	but	he	does	not	tell	us	how	the	distinction	should	be	made	or,	more	




of	 laws.56	Here,	 proponents	 of	 a	 market	 for	 laws	 see	 its	 biggest	 attraction	 in	 the	






However,	 leaving	 mandatory	 rules	 untouched	 will	 also	 leave	 legal	 pluralists	
unsatisfied.	 Facilitative	 rules	 are	 already	widely	 subject	 to	 party	 autonomy	under	
existing	private	law;	insofar	Smits	only	states	the	status	quo.	By	contrast,	the	main	
focus	 of	 legal	 pluralists	 is	 precisely	 on	 situations	 in	 which	 actors	 face	 conflicting	




























will	 succeed.	 Here,	 Smits	 takes	 up	 his	 earlier	 ideas	 of	 a	 ‘free	 movement	 of	 legal	




First,	 this	 looks,	 in	 the	 end,	 more	 like	 a	 monist	 than	 a	 pluralist	 theory.	 In	 the	
competition	for	legal	rules,	the	best	one	ultimately	wins,	and	we	have	unity.64	In	the	
Habermasian	 discourse,	 the	 better	 argument	 wins	 in	 the	 end,	 what	 we	 have	 is	 a	
tendency	toward	consensus	and	thus	unity.65		
	
Second,	 the	 hope	 that	 legal	 evolution	will,	 somehow,	 lead	 to	 victory	 of	 the	 better	
argument	presumes	a	 rather	perfect	 (‘herrschaftsfrei’)	market	 for	 those	 ideas,	 and	
no	 interventions	 from	 special	 interests.	 It	 thus	 runs	 up	 against	 a	 criticism,	which,	
from	 the	 opposite	 side,	 has	 been	 made	 against	 theories	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 too:	
blindness	 to	 power	 relations.66	In	 legal	 pluralism,	 the	 almost	 romantic	 fascination	
with	 intersystemic	dialogue	and	mutual	deference	 sometimes	 tends	 to	be	blind	 to	
the	role	of	power	in	determining	winners	and	losers.	Fascination	over	the	fact	that	
state	 law	 can	 never	 fully	 overcome	 non‐state	 law	 but	 is	 instead	 influenced	 by	 it,	
makes	some	legal	pluralists	blind	to	two	possibilities:	First,	the	state	may	sometimes	
be	 ‘cunning;’	 it	 may	 pretend	 to	 be	 weak	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 responsibility	 for	





























This	 preference	 for	 statutory	 determination	 of	 mandatory	 rules	 is	 shared	 in	 the	




Yet	 a	 different	 concept	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 emerges	 from	 the	 work	 of	 Thomas	
Wilhelmsson. 70 	Wilhelmsson	 aligns	 himself	 with	 postmodernism, 71 	and	 it	 is	




on	 the	national	 level.	As	a	consequence,	Wilhelmsson’s	 legal	pluralism	operates	at	
two	levels:	between,	and	within	national	legal	systems.	
























not	 provide	 a	 helpful	 model	 for	 a	 European	 codification,	 because	 ‘[t]he	 BGB	was	
made	 for	 a	 bourgeois	 society	 and	 for	 a[n]	 original	 market	 capitalism	 and	 in	 that	
sense	could	 reflect	a	 fairly	homogeneous	 	world	outlook.’74	Our	world	 is	different;	
we	 face	a	 ‘dissolution	of	 traditional	 structures	of	understanding’	 and	 therefore	 an	
ethical	 fragmentation	 that	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 captured	 by	 a	 coherent	 code.75	
Wilhelmsson’s	 plea	 for	 a	 ‘fragmentized	 Europeanization’76	realises	 that	 even	 if	
Europe	 retains	 a	 plurality	 of	 national	 legal	 systems,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 focus	
somehow	on	the	interrelation	between	these.	
However,	 unlike	 Legrand,	 Wilhelmsson	 does	 not	 treat	 national	 legal	 systems	 as	
relatively	 coherent	 and	 autonomous.	 Instead,	 he	 emphasizes	 also	 the	 internally	
pluralistic	character	of	national	 legal	systems.	The	same	dissolution	also	 functions	
on	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 becomes	 fragmented	 internally	 –	 different	
authorities	attain	semi‐autonomy	and	will	 thus	not	always	apply	the	same	law	the	
same	 way.	 But	 the	 state	 also	 becomes	 fragmented	 externally:	 ‘the	 borderline	
between	 state	 and	 society	 becomes	 less	 and	 less	 clear’ 77 	(an	 aspect	 that	
Wilhelmsson	does	not,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	discuss		at	great	length	elswhere.	




the	 idea	 that	 European	 law	 suddenly	 pops	 up	 within	 domestic	 legal	 systems	 in	

































A	 first	 problem	 is	 one	 that	we	 already	 saw	 in	 Legrand’s	 concept:	 the	 problem	 of	
internal	 homogeneity	 and	 essentialism.	 If	 pluralism	 is	 about	 plurality	 of	 legal	
systems,	 then	 it	 implies	 that	 differences	 between	 such	 systems	 are	 greater	 than	
differences	within	such	systems	–	and	thus,	 that	systems	themselves	are	relatively	
coherent	 internally.	This	 is	unproblematic	 for	a	communitarian	concept;	 indeed,	 it	




falls	 into	 this	 trap	 of	 homogeneity.81	The	 idea	 that	 Nordic	 law	 has	 certain	






more	 necessary	 it	 becomes	 that	 these	 legal	 systems	 are	 internally	 relatively	
coherent.	The	stronger	external	plurality	thus	implicates	an	internal	homogeneity.83	
	




















emerges	 from	 numerous	 internal	 struggles	 that	 remain	 infinitely	 unresolved,	 and	
‘social’	 ideas	 struggle	 with	 more	 market	 liberal	 ones.	 Scholars	 often	 take	
Wilhelmsson,	one	of	the	first	to	write	at	length	in	English	about	Scandinavian	law,	as	
a	 spokesperson	 for	 all	 of	 Scandinavia,	 because	 they	 cannot	 follow	 the	 internal	
Scandinavian	 debates.	 But	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 relatively	 coherent	 Scandinavian	
identity	 in	 law	 and	 society	 is	 used	 as	 a	 strategic	 argument	 to	 fight	 off	 certain	
influences	from	Europe	(or	to	propose	alternatives	for	European	law).	Wilhelmsson	
realizes	the	strategic	use	of	such	proclamations	of	homogeneity	when,	in	talking	of	





This	 last	 insight	 suggests	 a	 problem	with	 another	 of	Wilhelmsson’s	 claims	 about	
legal	 pluralism.	 I	 refer	 to	 his	 claim	 that	 pluralistic	 societies	 make	 pluralistic	 law	
necessary	 and	 unavoidable	 –	 or,	 the	 flipside,	 that	 systematic	 and	 monist	 law	 is	
possible	 only	 for	 homogenous	 societies.	 This	 is	 a	 frequently	 made	 argument	 in	
private	 law	 debates,	 but	 I	 think	 it	 either	 rests	 on	 an	 error	 or	 is	 at	 least	 too	
simplistic.86		
Consider	 Wilhelmsson’s	 claim	 that	 the	 systematic	 BGB	 was	 possible	 in	 the	 19th	
century	only	because	society	was	largely	homogeneous,	both	in	its	values	and	in	its	
setup.	This	historical	assumption	is	hardly	tenable:	German	19th	society	was	deeply	
fragmented.87	Political	 views	 ranged	 from	 far	 more	 extreme	 edges	 than	 they	 do	
today.	Society	was	relatively	stratified,	and	if	the	19th	century	was	the	century	of	the	
bourgeoise,	 then	 the	pleas	of	 the	working	 class	were	already	growing	 louder,	 and	
their	 exclusion	 from	 the	 new	 BGB	 was	 already	 a	 ground	 for	 its	 criticism.88	If	






















pluralistic	 society.91	The	 reason	 is	 that	 technical	 law	 can	 translate	 otherwise	
unsolvable	 substantive	 disputes	 into	 solvable	 technical	 ones 92 	Substantive	




pluralism.	 The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 political	 and	 societal	 pluralism	 is	 different	 from	
legal	pluralism,	and	one	does	not	immediately	translate	into	the	other.	
c) Irritants 
A	 third	 point,	 however,	may	 be	 the	most	 important	 one.	 Recall	 how	 Legrand	 and	
Smits	 dealt	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	 legal	 systems	 influencing	 each	 other.	 Legrand	
opposed	such	influence;	Smits	celebrated	it	as	a	welcome	consequence	of	regulatory	
competition	 and	 free	 party	 choice	 of	 law.	Wilhelmsson	 does	 not	 want	 to	 protect	







from	 one	 place	 to	 another,	 but	 of	 finding	 suitable	 legal	 irritants	 to	 develop	 one’s	
own	legal	surroundings’.93	
	
This	 reference	 to	 Teubner’s	 concept	 of	 legal	 irritants	 is	 interesting.94	Unlike	





















context,	 of	 course,	 strict	 analysis	 of	 social	 and	 cultural	 background	 are	 necessary	
(though	frequently	ignored).96	But	if	this	is	a	pluralist	perspective,	it	is	at	best	one	of	
weak	 legal	 pluralism:	 a	 pluralism	 that	 exists	 due	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	whole,	
which	in	this	case	is	not	the	state	but	something	functionally	similar,	the	European	
Union.	Ultimately,	it	appears,	Wilhelmsson	also	shies	away	from	taking	the	last	step	




pluralism.	 Legrand’s	 pluralism	 is	 a	 communitarianism	 without	 significant	
interactions	between	the	separate	legal	orders	he	has	in	mind.	Smits	proposes	a	real	
plurality	of	interacting	legal	orders,	but	then	leaves	untouched	what	is	perhaps	the	
central	 issue	 of	 legal	 pluralism,	 namely	 mandatory	 rules,.	 Wilhelmsson,	 finally,	
comes	 closest	 to	 an	 actual	 concept	 of	 pluralism,	 but	 oscillates	 between	 ideas	 of	
fragmentation	and	homogeneity,	and	flirts	with	regulatory	ordering	of	the	pluralism.	
An	actual	theory	of	European	private	law	pluralism	is	still	lacking.	
And	 it	may	 not	 be	 forthcoming.	 After	 all,	 all	 three	 concepts	 of	 legal	 pluralism	 are	
sharply	 different,	 but	 all	 have	 several	 traits	 in	 common,	 too,	 that	 may	 be	
characteristic	of	the	European	debate.	
A	first	commonality	is	that,	when	using	the	idea	of	legal	pluralism,	all	three	authors	
focus	 almost	 exclusively	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 plurality	 of	 (formal)	 legal	 systems	 –	 in	
particular,	national	legal	systems	–,	and	ignore	the	second	important	aspect	of	legal	
pluralism,	 namely	 the	 idea	 of	 privately	 created	 law.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 ideas	
about	 society	 are	 absent	 from	 the	 proposals:	 Legrand	 conceptualizes	 laws	 as	
mirrors	of	society;	Smits	suggests	that	choice	of	 law	is	a	way	to	opt	out	of	culture;	
Wilhelmsson	 suggests	 that	 the	 plurality	 of	 society	 makes	 plural	 legal	 systems	
necessary.	But	 in	 all	 these	 concepts,	 society	 is	 a	 cause	 for	 the	development	of	 the	
legal	system,	not	a	creator	of	law	on	its	own.	In	the	end,	what	all	of	them	focus	on	as	
their	 starting	 point,	 is	 formalized	 law.	 This	 is	 representative	 of	 most	 debates	 on	
European	private	law	more	generally.	
A	 second	commonality	 is	 that	none	of	 the	 three	authors	here	 settles	 for	a	 ‘strong’	
legal	 pluralism.	 Wilhelmsson	 and	 Smits	 both	 assume	 a	 superior	 lawmaker:	
Wilhelmsson’s	 lawmaker	 decides	 which	 irritants	 will	 work	 best;	 Smits’	 superior	
lawmaker	sets	up	a	system	of	choice	of	law	rules	that	protect	mandatory	rules	from	
free	choice.	Legrand	alone	seems	to	oppose	such	a	superior	lawmaker,	but	he	does	
appeal	 to	 a	 general	 ethical	 position	 against	 mutual	 domination	 and	 influence	










bad	 thing,	 at	 least	 analytically,	 perhaps	 even	 normatively.98	The	 legal	 pluralism	
debate	has	always	struggled	with	the	distinction	of	law	and	non‐law.	That	may	not	
be	 a	 problem	 for	 sociological	 and	 anthropological	 accounts,	 but	 it	 does	 become	 a	
problem	for	debates	about	law	reform.	
I	have	more	doubts	about	the	perceived	need	for	an	ordered,	weak,	as	opposed	to	a	
strong	 legal	 pluralism.	 But	 in	 discussions	 about	 law	 reform,	 a	 purely	 sociological	
perspective	as	 is	 inherent	 in	traditional	concepts	of	strong	 legal	pluralism,	may	be	
inadequate.	 It	may	 leave	 reform	 to	 technocractic	 law	 reformers	who	may	want	 to	
implement	German‐style	Codes	without	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 issues	 the	 three	authors	





and	 its	 adequacy	 for	 European	 private	 law?	 The	 fact	 that	 all	 existing	 pluralist	
theories	of	European	private	law	fail,	at	 least	as	theories,	does	not	mean	that	 legal	
pluralism	is	an	 intrinsically	 inappropriate	concept	 for	European	private	 law,	but	 it	
certainly	 leaves	 some	 doubts.	 Ultimately,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 legal	 pluralism	 is	 less	
adequate	 than	 other	 approaches:	 The	 idea	 of	 relatively	 autonomous	 legal	 orders	
does	not	square	well	with	the	interpenetration	of	European	and	national	law	in	the	
European	Union.	The	concept	of	interlegality,	although	occasionally	invoked	also	for	
the	 relation	 between	 European	 and	 national	 law,99	may	 be	 inferior	 to	 recent	
attempts	 to	 reinvigorate	 conflict	 of	 laws.100	This	 suggests	 that,	 ultimately,	 legal	
pluralism	may	 just	have	been	another	terminology	with	which	the	ongoing	debate	
on	European	private	law	has	been	led.	That	may	not	be	so	bad. 
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